The Right to Obscurity: How We Can Implement the Google Spain Decision by Hoffman, David et al.
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Volume 17 | Issue 3 Article 2
3-1-2016
The Right to Obscurity: How We Can Implement




Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Hoffman, Paula Bruening & Sophia Carter, The Right to Obscurity: How We Can Implement the Google Spain Decision, 17 N.C. J.L.
& Tech. 437 (2016).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol17/iss3/2
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
VOLUME 17, ISSUE 3: MARCH 2016 
 
437 
THE RIGHT TO OBSCURITY: HOW WE CAN IMPLEMENT THE 




On May 13, 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”) announced its judgment in Google Spain SL, Google 
Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Mario Consteja 
González. The decision required Google to delist certain internet 
search results when a search query was made using an 
individual’s name. Commentators worldwide have referred to this 
delisting as the Right to be Forgotten. This article analyzes the 
legal background of the case, and the implications for technology 
companies and individuals. Specifically, the article concludes the 
required delisting is much more about obscurity than forgetting. 
The article concludes by making a recommendation for how to 
create an obscurity center, which could implement the delisting 
requests.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 13, 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”) announced its judgment in Google Spain SL, Google 
Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Mario Consteja 
González (“Google Spain”).1 The decision handed down by the 
CJEU,2 has generated considerable controversy in the European 
Union (“EU”) and internationally.3 
The increasingly connected and personal nature of technology 
highlights the importance of this case. Individuals not only carry 
personal technology, such as smart phones,4 but many devices in 
the home connect directly to the internet, including cameras, 
microphones, and motion sensors. These devices give service 
providers an increasingly accurate and detailed view of an 
individual’s activities and location and a more comprehensive 
picture of what happens in the home. Any of this information could 
be posted to the Internet (1) if a service provider buries the right to 
do so in lengthy terms and conditions, (2) as a result of a data 
breach, or (3) by an unscrupulous employee of the service 
                                                
 1 Press Release No 70/14, Court of Justice of European Union, Judgment in 
Case C-131/12 Google Spain, SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de 
Proteccion de Datos, Mario Costeja Gonzalez (May 13, 2014), 
http://curia.europa.eu. 
 2 Because the CJEU is located in Luxembourg, it is often referred to in 
academic papers as the Luxembourg CJEU, not to be confused with the 
European CJEU of Human Rights (ECHR), which is located in Strasbourg, 
France. 
 3  See, e.g., Amber Melville-Brown & Caroline Thompson, Who-ogle? 
Rehabilitation in the Digital Age, THE TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article4244517.ece; Robert Peston, Why Has 
Google Cast Me Into Oblivion, BBC NEWS (Jul. 2, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28130581. Jeffrey Rosen called the concept 
a major threat to free expression, even before Google Spain. See Jeffrey Rosen, 
The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 90–92 (2012), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/right-to-be-forgotten. 
 4 Today, 68% of U.S. adults have a smartphone, up from 35% in 2011, and 
tablet computer ownership has edged up to 45% among adults. Smartphone 
ownership is nearing saturation with some groups: 86% between the ages of 18 
and 29 have a smartphone, as do 83% of those between the ages of 30 and 49, 
and 87% of those living in households earning $75,000 and up annually. Monica 
Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
(2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/. 
440 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 17: 437 
provider. How the CJEU opinion is interpreted and implemented in 
the time directly following the CJEU decision will have a lasting 
impact on the ability of individuals to rectify situations where this 
data is posted to the Internet. 
Many commentators interpreted the CJEU’s opinion as a call 
for a new “Right to Be Forgotten.”5 Legal and policy experts who 
study Internet privacy reacted to the decision as if the CJEU had 
demanded the burning of a library of books containing the 
collective history of mankind. One legal commentator referred to 
the CJEU judges as “clinically insane;”6 another referred to them 
as “European luddites.”7 This paper analyzes the decision and 
disagrees with this assessment based on the authors’ understanding 
of European law and the language of the opinion. 
This paper first provides an overview of the case and the legal 
foundations of the decision. It analyzes the ruling in the context of 
the 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(“Directive”). 8  Finally, this paper explains why the authors 
disagree with many criticisms of the ruling. 
Based on our analysis, we reach the following conclusions: 
(1) The opinion is a straightforward application of existing 
European law, substantially limited to the facts of the case. The 
CJEU’s rulings do not reflect a desire on the part of the judges for 
new legislation or policy. 
                                                
 5 See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Don’t Force Google to Forget, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/opinion/dont-force-
google-to-forget.html. 
 6  Steptoe Cyberlaw Podcast – Interview with David Hoffman, STEPTOE 
CYBERBLOG (Sept. 3, 2014), at 00:34:39, http://www.steptoe.com/staticfiles/ 
SteptoeCyberlawPodcast-032.mp3. 
 7 Michael Wolff, Wolff: The Right to be Forgotten by Google, USA TODAY 
(May 18, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/columnist/wolff/2014/ 
05/18/a-big-setback-for-google-in-europe/9172941/. 
 8 Council Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 
281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive]. 
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(2) The opinion’s impact on free expression is substantially 
mitigated as it explicitly permits the publishing of the information 
at issue in the case. Moreover, providing the opportunity for 
limited obscurity actually encourages free expression. 
(3) The opinion does not result in the actual “forgetting of any 
information,” as the information at issue can still be found using 
different search terms. 
(4) The opinion will present challenges and pose questions for 
search engines and data brokers that must comply with the CJEU’s 
findings. More guidance is necessary to help companies efficiently 
and consistently arrive at appropriate decisions regarding delisting 
certain answers from Internet searches. 
Key to our analysis of the case is the idea that the legal rights 
involved are not about “forgetting” but instead involve 
“obscurity.” This paper distinguishes these terms and demonstrates 
that the legal basis for the ruling in Google Spain is the Directive’s 
language providing for the limited ability for erasure.9 In the case 
of Google Spain, application of this provision would involve not 
deleting or removing the newspaper article in question, but rather 
making it necessary to enter more refined search terms than simply 
a person’s name to discover the article. This limited erasure right is 
quite different from concepts of “forgetting,” which would require 
going back to source documents on the internet and making certain 
that references to the primary material were removed entirely or 
rendered not obtainable. Thus, rather than “forgetting,” the 
application of the Directive’s erasure provisions to search engine 
results provides for “the right to obscurity.” 
The paper, then analyzes the case in light of developments in 
the law since 2014, looking to case law from the European Court 
of Human Rights (“ECHR”) to provide context for the CJEU 
decision.10 Finally, the paper focuses on future developments and 
approaches to the issue within Europe and in other jurisdictions.11 
                                                
 9 Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. 
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶ 100 (June 25, 2013).  
 10 See infra Part IV.E. 
 11 See infra Part V. 
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Although the ruling is a predictable interpretation of the language 
of the Directive, practical questions and concerns remain. The 
CJEU decision unfairly burdens Google and other search engine 
companies with determining when a request for obscurity should 
be granted. The paper proposes that this burden could be removed 
and calls for implementation of a global solution the authors refer 
to as the “Internet Obscurity Center.”12 
II. FACTS & PROCEDURE OF GOOGLE SPAIN 
In January 1998 and March 1998, the La Vanguardia 
newspaper published information about a real estate auction held 
to recover Mr. Costeja González’s social security debts.13 In 2010, 
Mr. Costeja González, a Spanish citizen, filed a complaint with the 
Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (“AEPD”)14 against La 
Vanguardia. He alleged that when an Internet user entered his 
name in Google’s search engine the user would be provided with 
links to the 1998 La Vanguardia newspaper entries announcing a 
foreclosure auction on Mr. Gonzalez’s home 15  Mr. Costeja 
González asked that La Vanguardia be required to remove the 
references to his name from the Internet postings of the original 
newspaper pages, and that Google and its Spanish subsidiary 
remove links to those pages from the results of searches of his 
name.16 The AEPD rejected the demand that La Vanguardia delete 
the references in the pages of La Vanguardia newspaper posted 
online, but granted the request that Google adjust the search results 
                                                
 12 See infra Part VI. 
 13 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 
14 (May 13, 2014). 
 14 The AEPD is the Spanish data protection authority. It is the national 
independent public authority responsible for ensuring compliance with data 
protection law. The Data Protection Agency interprets, applies and disseminates 
data protection law, maintains the General Data Protection Registry, safeguards 
citizens’ data protection rights, and authorizes international data transfers. Data 
Protection in Spain: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW (Dec. 1, 2015), 
http://uk.practicallaw.com/1-520-8264#a246427; see Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos, www.agpd.es (last visited Feb. 18, 2016). 
 15 Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 14. 
 16 Id. at ¶ 15. 
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so they would not return links to those pages in response to a query 
of Mr. Costeja González’s name. 17  Google appealed to the 
Audience Nacional, which in turn referred three questions about 
European law to the CJEU. 18  The three questions relate to 
jurisdiction, the role of the data processor, and data removal.19 The 
CJEU’s response to these questions prompted a global discussion 
about a so-called “Right to be Forgotten.”20 
III. THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF GOOGLE SPAIN 
The CJEU decided Google Spain based on the Directive and 
the relevant provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.21 
Analysis of the decision requires an understanding of these two 
documents. 
Data protection in the European Union is primarily governed 
by the Directive.22 The Directive was enacted based on Article 
114(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TFEU”). 23  Article 114(1) states generally that the European 
                                                
 17 Id. at ¶¶ 16–17. 
 18 Id. at ¶¶ 17–20. 
 19 See infra Part IV. 
 20 See, e.g., Debate: Should The U.S. Adopt The ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ 
Online?, NPR (Mar. 18, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/03/18/393643901/ 
debate-should-the-u-s-adopt-the-right-to-be-forgotten-online; Julia Powles & 
Enrique Chaparro, How Google Determined Our Right to be Forgotten, THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 18 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/ 
18/the-right-be-forgotten-google-search. 
 21 The European Charter of Fundamental Rights contains rights and freedoms 
under six titles: Dignity, Freedoms, Equality, Solidarity, Citizens’ Rights, and 
Justice. The charter became legally binding in 2009 with the treaty of Lisbon. 
See EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/charter/index_en.htm [hereinafter 
European Charter]. 
22  EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, Handbook on 
European Data Protection Law 17 (2014), http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ 
fra-2014-handbook-data-protection-law-2nd-ed_en.pdf. 
 23 ORLA LYNSKEY, From Market-Making Tool to Fundamental Right: The 
Role of the CJEU of Justice in Data Protection’s Identity Crisis, in EUROPEAN 
DATA PROTECTION: COMING OF AGE 59, 60 (Serge Gutwirth et. al. eds., 2013); 
see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union art. 114, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU] 
(explaining the authority for the adoption of the Directive). 
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Council and the Parliament may enact laws and measures to ensure 
the proper functioning of the internal market.24 
As required by law, the CJEU interpreted the facts of the case 
and the Directive in light of the applicable provisions in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (“European Charter”). 25  The 
Charter, adopted in 2000, has been “a legally binding instrument of 
EU law since late 2009, binding both the EU institutions and the 
Member States . . . .”26 The Charter is referenced in Article 6 of the 
Lisbon Treaty.27  The Lisbon Treaty modified two pre-existing 
treaties governing the mechanisms for operating the European 
Union. 28  When it came into force on December 1, 2009, it 
established the Charter as legally binding. The extent to which 
provisions of the Charter can be directly enforced by Member 
States of the CJEU is not clear. However, Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter—which articulate the rights to Respect of Privacy and 
Family Life and Protection of Personal Data—are foundational to 
understanding privacy and data protection rights in the European 
Union.29 The key provision in the Charter applied by the CJEU in 
Google Spain is Article 8, which makes clear that data that relates 
to an individual must be processed fairly.30 
                                                
 24 TFEU, supra note 23. 
 25 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 1 
(May 13, 2014) (“This request for a preliminary ruling concerns . . . Article 8 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”); see also European 
Charter, supra note 21. 
 26 Gráinne de Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court 
of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & 
COMP. L. 168, 169 (2013). 
 27 Art. 6(1) of the Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”), as amended by the 
Treaty of Lisbon, states that the Union recognizes “the rights, freedoms and 
principles set out in the Charter . . . which shall have the same legal value as the 
Treaties.” See Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union art. 6(1), 
Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13, 19. 
 28 Id. 
 29 PAUL DE HERT & SERGE GUTWIRTH, Data Protection in the Case Law of 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg: Constitutionalism in Action, 18 REINVENTING 
DATA PROTECTION? 3, 7 (Serge Gutwirth et. al. eds., 2009). 
 30 European Charter, supra note 21, at 10. The relevant articles state: 
Article 7 Respect for private and family life 
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It is also important to understand the distinction between the 
Charter and the European Convention on Human Rights (“the 
Convention”). 31  The Convention was adopted in 1953 by the 
Council of Europe.32 While all of the members of the European 
Union are also members of the Council of Europe, the two 
institutions and their roles are separate and distinct.33 The Council 
of Europe created the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) 
to interpret the Convention.34 When the EU began its process to 
create the Charter, the provisions of the Convention served as its 
starting point.35 The language of the two documents is similar and 
their provisions overlap in some areas. 36  As a consequence, 
                                                                                                         
Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, 
home and communications. 
Article 8 Protection of personal data 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning 
him or her; 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate 
basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which 
has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it 
rectified; 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an 
independent authority. 
Id. 
 31  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention]. 
 32 See Aisa Gani, What is the European Convention on Human Rights?, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/oct/03/what-
is-european-convention-on-human-rights-echr (describing the history of the 
convention and the main principles). 
 33 See European Convention, supra note 31. 
34 See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 22 
at 14. 
 35Compare European Convention, supra note 31 (“Considering that this 
Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and 
observance of the Rights therein declared”), with European Charter, supra note 
21 (“[I]t is necessary to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights in the 
light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and technological 
developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter.”). 
 36 See, e.g., European Charter, supra note 21 at art. 52(3) (“[S]o far as this 
Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning 
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procedurally “judges first consider the Charter and then adopt 
other human rights sources . . . .”37 The jurisprudence of the ECHR 
is used as a tool of interpretation for CJEU decisions: 
[t]he Court may adopt, with respect to provisions of the Convention, an 
interpretation which does not coincide exactly with that given by the 
Strasbourg authorities, in particular the European Court of Human 
Rights. It is not bound, in so far as it does not have systematically to 
take into account, as regards fundamental rights under Community law, 
the interpretation of the Convention given by the Strasbourg 
authorities.38 
Article 52 of the Charter prohibits the CJEU from interpreting 
the law in a way that would contravene the protection of the human 
rights of a European citizen. 39  In this way, the architects of 
European law have assured that even if the CJEU does not follow 
the exact analysis as the ECHR on a similar issue, it must still look 
to the ECHR case law for guidance. Two prominent Advocates 
General add that: 
[t]he Convention can be used as a second fundamental source in 
identifying shared legal positions and the scope of their application. 
Since its ratification, the [CJEU] increasingly refers to the Convention 
to determine the basis and scope of fundamental rights. Furthermore, 
the [CJEU] has explicitly recognized that EU [CJEUs] have to take the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg into 
account in interpreting fundamental rights.40 
                                                                                                         
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention.”). 
 37  Sonia Morano-Foadi & Stelios Andreadakis, Reflections on the 
Architechture of the EU After the Treaty of Lisbon: The European Judicial 
Approach to Fundamental Rights, 17 EUR. L. J. 595, 600 (2011), 
http://www.cesruc.org/uploads/soft/130303/1-130303200129.pdf.    
 38 RICK A. LAWSON, Confusion and Conflict? Diverging Interpretations of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in Strasbourg and Luxembourg, THE 
DYNAMICS OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE - ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF PROFESSOR HENRY G. SCHERMERS 219, 228 (R.A. Lawson & M. 
de Blois, eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers vol. III 1994) (footnote omitted). 
 39 Article 52(3) of the European Charter states in part, “[i]n so far as this 
Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning 
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention[.]” See European Charter, supra note 21, at art. 52(3). 
 40 Julianne Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union After Lisbon 2 (European Univ. Inst. Acad. of European 
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The CJEU was not charged with making a global public policy 
recommendation but instead with answering specific questions of 
European law.41 The CJEU applied the law narrowly, addressing 
only the question of what constitutes a relevant and proportionate 
response to a search query of Mr. Costeja González’s name.42 
While the CJEU might appropriately be criticized for failing to 
take into consideration the policy impact of its decisions, the CJEU 
is only officially charged with answering the questions of 
European law posed to it by member state courts. 
IV. ANALYSIS: THE MAIN QUESTIONS 
Google Spain addresses three questions. The first question 
relates to jurisdiction: should the erasure rights provision of the 
Directive (under which the Spanish data protection law is 
implemented) apply to Google with respect to the Google search 
engine’s response to a query, when that query is the name of an 
individual living in Spain, and the results provide links to the 
website of a Spanish newspaper?43 The second question examines 
the role of the data processor and data controller: 44  if the 
provisions of the Directive apply to this type of search, should 
Google and/or its Spanish subsidiary be considered “controllers” 
(as defined by the Directive) who are processing (as defined by the 
                                                                                                         
Law, EUI Working Paper No. AEL 2010/6, 2010), http://cadmus.eui.eu/ 
bitstream/handle/1814/15208/AEL_WP_2010_06.pdf?sequence=3. 
 41 Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. 
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶ 20 (June 25, 2013). 
 42 Id. at ¶ 98. 
 43 Id. at ¶ 20. 
 44 Article 2(e) defines a data processor as, “a natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or any other body which processes personal data on behalf of 
the controller.” Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 2(e). Article 2(d) 
defines a data controller as:  
the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body 
which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means 
of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of 
processing are determined by national or Community laws or 
regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his nomination 
may be designated by national or Community law. 
Id. at art. 2(d). 
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Directive) personal data?45 The third question evaluates the notion 
of removal: should an individual have the ability to lodge a 
complaint to prevent a search engine from linking to information 
lawfully published by third parties?46 Each of these questions are 
now examined in turn to analyze the reasoning of the CJEU. 
A. Jurisdiction 
The Google Spain decision relies heavily on the European 
Union’s Article 29 Working Party 2008 analysis of jurisdiction 
found in its Opinion 1/2008 (“WP 148”).47 That opinion, in effect, 
states that an entity is subject to the laws of jurisdictions to which 
it purposefully avails itself.48 
The European Union’s Article 29 Working Party previously 
analyzed the issue of whether the Directive should apply to search 
engines that are not located in an EU member state.49 According to 
the analysis, EU data protection law applies in two specific 
situations: (1) when the search engine has an “establishment” in 
                                                
 45 The Directive defines the “processing” of data as “any operation or set of 
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic 
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination 
or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or 
destruction.” Id. at ch. 1, art. 1(b). 
 46 The Directive defines “third parties” as “any natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or any other body other than the data subject, the controller, 
the processor and the persons who, under the direct authority of the controller or 
the processor, are authorized to process the data.” Id. at ch. 1, art. 1(f). 
 47  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Opinion 1/2008 on Data 
Protection Issues Related to Search Engines 00737/EN/WP 148, (Apr. 4, 2008) 
[hereinafter WP29 Opinion], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2008/wp148_en.pdf. 
 48 See, e.g., Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 29 (Article 29 of 
the Directive calls for the establishment of a “working party” of national data 
protection authorities.); see also id. at art. 30. The working group advises the 
European Commission on the latest challenges in European data privacy, makes 
recommendations on new legislation and assesses the level of “adequacy” of 
protection in third-countries. See generally Burkard Eberlein & Abraham L. 
Newman, Escaping the International Governance Dilemma? Incorporated 
Transgovernmental Networks in the European Union, 21 GOVERNANCE 25, 38–
39 (2008). 
 49 WP29 Opinion, supra note 47, at 8–11. 
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the EU Member state;50 and (2) when the search engine makes use 
of equipment in the EU Member state. 51  The analysis is of 
particular interest in the case of Google Spain, because it focuses 
on the protection of the personal data of the individual entering the 
search query, rather than on protection of the individual who is the 
subject of the query.52 It clearly states that an entity does have an 
“establishment” when it creates “an office in a Member state 
(“EEA”) that is involved in the selling of targeted advertisements 
to the inhabitants of that state[,]” as long as those advertisements 
“play a relevant role in the particular processing operation.”53 
However, it also says that the use of equipment will not qualify as 
an “establishment” if used “only for purposes of transit through the 
territory.”54 
The CJEU ultimately determined that Google’s Spanish 
subsidiary was in the business of selling advertising linked to the 
display of search results of the query of Mr. Costeja González’s 
name.55 Therefore, it never took up the issue of whether Google’s 
use of automated indexing software on the Internet would 
constitute the “use of equipment” sufficient to satisfy the 
establishment requirement. 
The CJEU’s adoption of the Working Party’s analysis is not 
surprising: it comports with generally accepted United States law 
about international jurisdiction that subjects an entity to the laws of 
jurisdictions of which it purposefully avails itself.56 The CJEU 
concluded that when Google set up an entity in Spain to sell 
advertising related to search query results, it became subject to the 
Spanish data protection law. 57  In other words, organizations 
                                                
 50 Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 4(1)(a). 
 51 Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 4(1)(c). 
 52 WP29 Opinion, supra note 47, at 6–7. 
 53 WP29 Opinion, supra note 47, at 10. 
 54 WP29 Opinion, supra note 47, at 10–11. 
 55 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at 
¶¶ 55–57 (May 13, 2014). 
 56  Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in 
Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 119, 
175. 
 57 Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 57. 
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engaged in moneymaking activities targeting a particular country 
are subject to its laws. 
B. Data Controller & Processing 
If Google’s sale of advertising in Spain subjects it to Spanish 
data protection law, it is necessary to consider the CJEU’s analysis 
of whether Google was a “controller” that was “processing” 
personal data according to the Directive. 
The CJEU found that Google is a Controller under the 
definition in the Directive, because Google determines the purpose 
and means of organizing personal data. 58  Article 2(d) of the 
Directive defines a Controller as “the natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly 
with others determines the purposes and means of the processing 
of personal data . . . .” 59  With respect to the indexing of the 
personal data included in the results of the search queries, the 
CJEU concluded without much analysis that Google “determines 
the purposes and means” by the nature of its algorithm organizing 
the personal data to determine which search results to display, and 
in what order to display them.60 
The CJEU spent more time analyzing whether by providing 
those search engine results, Google was “processing” personal data 
under the law. Article 2(b) of the Directive defines “processing” as 
“any operation or set of operations which is performed upon 
personal data, whether or not by automatic means, such as 
collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or 
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, 
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or 
combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.” 61  It found that 
Google is “processing data” based on its analysis that Google’s 
                                                
 58 Id. at ¶ 41. 
 59 Data Protection Directive, supra note 8,  art. 2(d). 
 60 Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 33 (“It is the search engine operator 
which determines the purposes and means of that activity and thus of the 
processing of personal data that it itself carries out within the framework of that 
activity and which must, consequently, be regarded as the ‘controller’ in respect 
of that processing pursuant to Article 2(d).”). 
 61 Council Directive 95/46, art. 2(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC). 
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search engine does not simply transmit information but processes 
and organizes information to help individuals find answers to 
questions.62 
The CJEU’s interpretation of this definition is particularly 
important. If information intermediaries are found to be 
“processing personal data” merely by transmitting information 
through their equipment or software, then application of the law 
could create a substantial barrier and cost for the operation of the 
Internet.63 The primary question is whether Google’s search engine 
functions more like a telephone service provider64 that simply 
allows the information to pass through, or more like a private 
investigator who helps individuals find the answers to their 
questions. 
The merits of the CJEU’s analysis of this issue are open to 
debate. The CJEU appears to comment on Google’s indexing 
activities when it states:  
in exploring the internet automatically, constantly and systematically in 
search of the information which is published there, the operator of a 
search engine ‘collects’ such data which it subsequently ‘retrieves’, 
‘records’ and ‘organises’ within the framework of its indexing 
programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’ 
and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of lists of search results.65  
The CJEU appears to rely upon the fact that Google displays 
results “according to a particular order of preference” and therefore 
must be deemed to be “processing personal data.”66 The CJEU’s 
conclusion is also supported by the Working Party opinion on 
search engines, which states: “Search engines process information, 
including personal information, by crawling, analysing and 
                                                
 62 Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 55 (May 13, 2014). 
63 The internet relies on a variety of hardware, software and services to allow 
information to be transmitted globally.  If all companies who produce these 
products and services were held responsible for the content sent over the 
internet, then it would be a substantial disincentive for companies to provide 
these products. 
 64 It is the telephone service provider’s role as an information intermediary to 
take data from point A to point B, without modifying that data in any way. 
 65 Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 28 (May 13, 2014). 
 66 Id. at ¶ 20–21 & ¶ 41.  
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indexing the World Wide Web and other sources they make 
searchable and thereby easily accessible through these services.”67 
Google’s success in the marketplace has depended on its ability 
to accurately determine which results individuals want to see. The 
CJEU appears to be saying that indexing based on importance to 
the searcher makes the company’s search engine activities function 
more like a private investigator and less like a telephone service 
provider. 
The CJEU’s conclusion may be difficult to align with the body 
of law in Europe and the United States that determines whether an 
information intermediary can be liable for the content delivered 
over its website and network. In the European Union (“EU”), the 
controlling legal instrument on this issue is the E-commerce 
Directive. 68  Article 12 of the EU’s E-commerce Directive 
addresses the definition of an information intermediary by asking 
whether the Internet service is acting as a “mere conduit” of the 
information.69 Under this definition, the EU exempts the company 
from liability if it satisfies the following three conditions: (a) does 
not initiate the transmission; (b) does not select the receiver of the 
transmission; and (c) does not select or modify the information in 
the results. In the Google case, the CJEU appears to be of the 
opinion that Google’s use of an algorithm to index information and 
determine which results to provide to the search query causes it to 
fail part (c) of this test, as it “selects” the information in the results. 
Other countries have different standards for determining 
information intermediary liability, and may come to a different 
                                                
 67 WP29 Opinion, supra note 47, at 13. 
 68 See Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic 
commerce’) 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter E-commerce Directive], http://eur-l 
ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0031:en:HTML. 
 69 Id. at ¶ 44 (stating that “[a] service provider who deliberately collaborates 
with one of the recipients of his service in order to undertake illegal acts goes 
beyond the activities of ‘mere conduit’ or ‘caching’ and as a result cannot 
benefit from the liability exemptions established for these activities”). 
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result.70 However, it is odd that Google has contended in their 
statements about the CJEU’s ruling that it is an information 
intermediary that should not be subject to restrictions based on the 
information delivered through its service, and at the same time 
asserted that it is a speaker being censored by being prohibited 
from displaying the results that its algorithm determines to best 
respond to the query.71 
C. Removal of Search Engine Link 
Given the basis for the CJEU determination that Google is 
subject to Spanish data protection law, and that Google satisfies 
the definitions of “controller” and “processing” in this context, 
analysis turns to how the CJEU interpreted the Directive. Popular 
media outlets incorrectly report that the CJEU’s opinion 
establishes a “right to be forgotten.”72 While that term describes an 
element of the proposed General Data Protection Regulation 
(“Regulation”) 73  currently under consideration which would 
replace the Directive, the way in which the question was posed in 
the case created some of this confusion. For example, the Spanish 
Court asked the CJEU the following: 
3. Regarding the scope of the right of erasure and/or the right to object, 
in relation to the derecho al olvido, [the right to be forgotten] the 
                                                
 70 See e.g., Communications Decency Act 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2015) (granting 
immunity to third-party publishers like search engines and service providers 
from libel, defamation and other privacy torts). 
 71 David Drummond, We Need to Talk about the Right to be Forgotten, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 10, 2014, 5:05PM), http://www.theguardian.com/comment 
isfree/2014/jul/10/right-to-be-forgotten-european-ruling-google-debate (“[T]he 
Guardian could have an article on its website about an individual that’s perfectly 
legal, but we might not legally be able to show links to it in our results when you 
search for that person’s name. It’s a bit like saying the book can stay in the 
library but cannot be included in the library’s card catalogue.”). 
 72 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, The Solace of Oblivion, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 
29, 2014) http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/solace-oblivion 
(“The Court went on to say . . . that all individuals in the countries within its 
jurisdiction had the right to prohibit Google from linking to items that were 
‘inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they were processed and in the light of the time that has 
elapsed.’”) (emphasis added).  
 73 See GDPR Proposal, infra note 82. 
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following question is asked: must it be considered that the rights to 
erasure and blocking of data, provided for in Article 12(b), and the 
right to object, provided for by Article 14(a), of Directive 95/46/EC, 
extend to enabling the data subject to address himself to search engines 
in order to prevent indexing of the information relating to him 
personally, published on third parties’ web pages, invoking his wish 
that such information should not be known to internet users when he 
considers that it might be prejudicial to him or he wishes it to be 
consigned to oblivion, even though the information in question has 
been lawfully published by third parties?74 
This question is a fairly straightforward request for analysis of 
the provisions of the Directive. However, both the language in the 
header, stating that the question should be evaluated in the context 
of derecho al olvido and its inclusion of a phrase about the 
individual asking that the information be “consigned to oblivion” 
(also emphasized) create an impression that the CJEU’s holding is 
broader that it is in fact.75 
The CJEU spends little time considering what it means to be 
“forgotten” or “consigned to oblivion.” In fact, the CJEU’s 
responses to the four questions referred to it do not include the 
words “forgotten,” “forgetting” or “oblivion.” The CJEU’s 
analysis only includes these words to refer back to the Spanish 
CJEU’s questions76 or to reference arguments made by the parties 
to the case.77 Rather, the CJEU spends the majority of its opinion 
describing how Mr. Costeja González’s request for deletion of the 
links fits squarely within Article 6(1)(c) of the Directive.78 
The Directive’s Article 6(1)(c) requires “that personal data 
must be . . . adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed.”79 
The CJEU analyzes this provision of the Directive by asking what 
                                                
 74 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 
20 (May 13, 2014). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at ¶ 89. 
 77 Id. at ¶¶ 90–91. 
 78 Id. at ¶ 72 & ¶ 92. 
 79 Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, art. 6(1)(c). 
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the “further processing” of the information was in this context.80 
On this point, the CJEU applies the law quite narrowly, and states 
several times that it is only asking the question of which results are 
a relevant and proportionate response to a search query of Mr. 
Costeja González’s name.81 The CJEU does not determine whether 
those same results would have been appropriate for searches of 
“Costeja González real estate auction,” “La Vanguardia social 
security debts,” or “1998 real estate auctions.” Given the repeated 
language in the opinion limiting application of the ruling only to 
results responding to queries of Mr. González’s name, it is 
reasonable to think the CJEU may have decided that the linked 
pages at issue in the case would have been appropriate for searches 
specifically targeting Mr. González’s real estate affairs and social 
security debts. 
So why has this limited ruling created such a stir about a so-
called “right to be forgotten?” Many legal commentators and 
companies have expressed concern with the EU’s attempts to place 
a “right to be forgotten” in the General Data Protection 
Regulation.82 As originally proposed by the European Commission, 
                                                
 80 Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. 
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶ 98 (June 25, 2013). 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, art. 17, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 
[hereinafter GDPR Proposal]. See also Miquel Peguera, The Shaky Ground of 
the Right to be Delisted, VAND. J. OF ENT. & TECH. L. (forthcoming, 2016) 
(manuscript at 4, note 5) (explaining that both the European Parliament and the 
European Council have adopted different possible versions of the GDPR). For a 
comparative table demonstrating the differences between the proposals, see 
Council of the European Union,  Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General 
Data Protection Regulation), http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jul/eu-
council-dp-reg-trilogue-10391-15.pdf [hereinafter GDPR Comparison Chart]. 
European lawmakers aim to have a final text at the conclusion of the trilogues 
period at the end of 2015. As of December 2015, regulation was still in the 
“trilogue” process. Trilogues are an informal part of the European Union 
decision making process whereby representatives from the Commission, 
Council of Ministers and European Parliament gather to pre-negotiate politically 
urgent legislation. Agreements that are borne out of the trilogues process are 
later ratified through the formal decision making processes of the Union. The 
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the GDPR would have established this right and obligated online 
publishers to delete sources or posted references to sites where 
personal data were originally posted or processed.83 Had such a 
provision been implemented it might have created some type of 
“forgetting” or “oblivion.” However, this language was widely 
criticized as impossible to implement and was not included in the 
GDPR as adopted.84 
More recent language from the European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union substantially narrowed the 
obligation to closely reflect the provisions in Article 6(1)(c) of the 
Directive.85 While the relevant provision’s title still includes the 
phrase “The Right to be Forgotten,” the requirements created by 
the text are similar to those of Article 6(1)(c) of the Directive.86 
                                                                                                         
purpose of the process is to find an accord on a package of amendments 
acceptable to both the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. 
Negotiations often take about a year but can help fast-track legislation through 
the political process. See, e.g., Christine Reh, Is Informal Politics 
Undemocratic? Triologues, Early Agreements and the Selection Model of 
Representation, 21 J. OF EUR. PUB. POL. 822, 829 (2014). 
 83 See GDPR Comparison Chart, supra note 82. 
 84 Id. The Commission Language stated:  
(53) Any person should have the right to have personal data concerning 
them rectified and a ‘right to be forgotten’ where the retention of such 
data is not in compliance with this Regulation. In particular, data 
subjects should have the right that their personal data are erased and no 
longer processed, where the data are no longer necessary in relation to 
the purposes for which the data are collected or otherwise processed, 
where data subjects have withdrawn their consent for processing or 
where they object to the processing of personal data concerning them 
or where the processing of their personal data otherwise does not 
comply with this Regulation. This right is particularly relevant, when 
the data subject has given their consent as a child, when not being fully 
aware of the risks involved by the processing, and later wants to 
remove such personal data especially on the Internet. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
85 GDPR Comparison Chart, supra note 83. 
 86 Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, at art. 6(1)(c) (“Member States 
shall provide that personal data must be . . . adequate, relevant and not excessive 
in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further 
processed.”). 
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D. The Balancing Test 
The CJEU relied on the legal obligation set forth in the 
Directive that data be “adequate, relevant and not excessive” in 
determining that the processing purpose of indexing information 
based only on a query of an individual’s name did not outweigh the 
impact on the individual’s privacy.87 The CJEU’s opinion, contrary 
to its depiction in the media, creates a narrow, fact-based 
determination that sixteen-year-old real estate debts are not 
relevant enough in this context. The CJEU determined that in this 
instance the purpose of indexing information just based on a search 
query of an individual’s name did not outweigh the potential 
impact on the individual’s right to privacy.88 
However, neither the Spanish Court, nor the CJEU, required 
that the underlying newspaper articles should be deleted from the 
Internet. Interestingly, the CJEU, in a sense, said that Google’s 
algorithm did a poor job of indexing the search results.89 Google 
attempts to provide search results that are as relevant as possible 
for the searcher.90 Individuals who want to know as much as 
possible about another person (for example, a parent searching on 
the name of a prospective babysitter), may view even financial 
data dating back sixteen years as relevant. Google’s market share 
in Internet searching appears to indicate that the company is quite 
good at producing relevant results. 
                                                
 87 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 
72 (May 13, 2014). See also Data Protection Directive, supra note 8, art. 6. 
 88 Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, at ¶ 91 (explaining that the plaintiff “may 
oppose the indexing by a search engine of personal data relating to him where 
their dissemination through the search engine is prejudicial to him and his 
fundamental rights to the protection of those data and to privacy — which 
encompass the ‘right to be forgotten’ — override the legitimate interests of the 
operator of the search engine and the general interest in freedom of 
information.”). 
 89 Id. at ¶ 92–93. 
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The CJEU’s opinion raises additional questions. Even if some 
search results are deemed relevant, when would these results be 
deemed excessive? What does “excessive” mean in the context of a 
search engine? These are important questions, but the facts of this 
case did not require the CJEU to fully examine them. Instead, the 
CJEU appears to rely upon the facts that the newspaper articles 
were sixteen years old and were not currently relevant to a search 
of Mr. Costeja González’s name. 
This case suggests consideration of a hypothetical Internet 
company called www.spyonyourneighbor.com, and whether 
privacy legislation should prohibit the use of personal data to spy 
on individuals. It may be that the business of 
www.spyonyourneighbor.com is not hypothetical at all, but rather 
an aspect of the way search engines function. The CJEU addressed 
this capability of search engines straight on, and determined that 
displaying results to a search engine query of an individual’s name 
requires that those results comply with Article 6 of the Directive.91 
While this ruling creates complexity and highlights important 
policy considerations related to the free flow of information, it 
does not result in complete “forgetting,” as more precise searches 
could still provide results that link to the information. 
Moreover, the result is not surprising, as it is a straightforward 
interpretation of the relevancy requirements of Article 6.92 The 
result is, therefore, much more about obscurity than it is about a 
right to be forgotten. The ruling has the effect of obscuring 
information from searches solely based on a name, when the 
search results are irrelevant or excessive. The author has also 
written about the value of using obscurity to protect privacy.93 And 
                                                
 91 Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. 
v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶ 48 (June 25, 2013) (“An internet search engine 
service provider may automatically acquire personal data relating to its users 
. . . .”). 
 92 For an explanation of “relevancy requirement,” see supra notes 74–76 and 
accompanying text. 
 93 David Hoffman, How Obscurity Could Help the Right to Fail, POLICY @ 
INTEL BLOG (Mar. 13, 2013) https://blogs.intel.com/policy/2013/03/29/how-
obscurity-could-help-the-right-to-fail/ (explaining that obscurity is a rational 
MAR. 2016] Implementing the Google Spain Decision 459 
for those who incorrectly assume these concepts of relevance and 
obscurity are only European or theoretical, one commentator has 
described both how these important concepts form the basis for 
some of the United States’ most effective privacy legislation, the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act.94 
E. Comparing Google Spain to European Court of Human Rights 
Free Expression Jurisprudence 
This section looks to the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”) case law for principles for evaluating conflicts between 
privacy and free expression. Critical to any analysis of the Google 
Spain opinion is its impact on free expression. The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights not only includes Articles 7 and 8 as 
mentioned above, but also Article 11: the Right to Freedom of 
Expression and Information.95 The Charter’s Article 11 was largely 
based on the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights 
Article 10.96 
                                                                                                         
desire because individuals need “a sphere of privacy where they know they can 
make mistakes, without those errors following them for the rest of their lives”). 
 94 Martin Abrams, Context & Balance, THE INFO. ACCOUNTABILITY FOUND. 
BLOG (Jul. 14, 2014), http://informationaccountability.org (“Many have argued 
that the limits built into the FCRA [Fair Credit Reporting Act] are an abuse of 
free expression. However, the context is a societal value that old payment data 
should not affect employment, credit, or insurance.”). 
 95 European Charter, supra, note 21, art. 11, (Freedom of expression and 
information) states: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers; 
(2) The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected. 
Id. 
 96 European Convention, supra note 31, at art. 10. Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights states: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
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The CJEU’s minimalist mode of analysis and opinion writing 
provides little clarity with respect to many of the legal issues in 
Google Spain, among them how to balance privacy against 
freedom of expression.97 A curious CJEU omission is an analysis 
of ECHR case law on this point. As one commentator noted, 
“[T]he judgment appears to dismiss important considerations that 
can conflict with the right to be forgotten, such as the rights of 
freedom of expression and access to information . . . .” 98  The 
ECHR is no stranger to data protection and privacy law issues, 
therefore it is puzzling that the CJEU chose not to look to some of 
the ECHR’s cases.99 Three cases have been brought before the 
ECHR that are directly on point, namely Axel Springer AG v. 
                                                                                                         
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
Id. 
 97 Other commentators have criticized the CJEU’s balancing approach in 
Google Spain. See e.g., Christopher Kuner, The Court of Justice of the EU 
Judgment on Data Protection and Internet Search Engines, 3/2015 LONDON 
SCHOOL OF ECON. AND POL. SCI. (LSE) LAW, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMY WORKING 
PAPER SERIES 1, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2496060; Eleni Frantziou, Further 
Developments in the Right to be Forgotten: The European Court of Justice’s 
Judgment in Case C-131/12, Google Spain, SL, Google Inc v Agencia Espanola 
de Proteccion de Datos, 14 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 761 (2014); Michael L. 
Rustad and Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right To Be Forgotten To 
Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349 (2015). 
 98 FRANTZIOU, supra note 97, at 762. 
 99 Cross-references between the two CJEUs have been increasing over time, 
reaching over 57 mentions in 2011. Elena Butti, The Roles and Relationship 
between the Two European CJEUs in Post-Lisbon EU Human Rights 
Protection, JURIST (Sept. 12, 2013), http://jurist.org/dateline/2013/09/elena-
butti-lisbon-treaty.php. 
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Germany,100 Von Hannover v. Germany,101 and Węgrzynowski & 
Smolczewski v. Poland.102 
Axel Springer AG and Von Hannover were two cases involving 
well-known public figures attempting to enjoin media outlets from 
publishing (potentially) damaging information about their private 
lives.103 The ECHR in both instances articulated a detailed test to 
provide guidance on how to evaluate the tension between free 
expression (Article 10) and privacy (Article 8). 104  In both 
judgments, the ECHR explains that, “Where the right to freedom 
                                                
 100 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 227, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109034. 
 101 (No. 2), 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
109029. 
 102  Wegrzynowski & Smolczewski v. Poland, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 224, 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122365. 
 103 Axel Springer AG, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 227 at ¶¶ 9–15; Von Hannover, 2012 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 228 at ¶¶ 10–15. 
 104 European Convention, supra note 31. Art. 8 (Respect for private and 
family life) states: 
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his 
home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and 
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Id. 
Art. 10 (Freedom of expression) states: 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information 
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of 
frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. 
European Convention, supra note 31. Art. 10. 
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of expression is being balanced against the right to respect for 
private life, the criteria laid down in the case-law that are relevant 
to the present case are set out” in a six-point test.105 The test 
requires the ECHR to examine: (1) contribution to a debate of 
general interest; (2) how well-known is the person concerned and 
what is the subject of the report; (3) prior conduct of the person 
concerned; (4) method of obtaining the information and its 
veracity/circumstances in which the [media] was published or 
acquired; (5) content, form, and consequences of the publication; 
and (6) the severity of the sanction imposed by the local courts.106 
The interplay of the values underlying Article 8 and Article 10 are 
well expressed in elements of the six-point test. Critics of Google 
Spain might have been more satisfied with the decision had the 
CJEU applied a detailed analysis of the facts as seen through the 
lens of this test. 
In Węgrzynowski & Smolczewski v. Poland two lawyers filed 
suit against an online news media website that allegedly published 
libelous information about them.107 When the local court refused to 
hear their request to have the article removed from print, the 
plaintiffs filed a complaint with the ECHR, arguing that Polish 
Government breached their rights to respect for their private life 
and reputation, as protected by Article 8 of the Convention.108 
Here, the ECHR did not reiterate the Springer-Hannover test, but 
they did mention both cases in the decisions. 109  The ECHR 
expressed reservations about applying offline media regulations to 
the Internet, stating: 
[t]he Internet is an information and communication tool particularly 
distinct from the printed media, especially as regards [to] the capacity 
to store and transmit information. The electronic network, serving 
                                                
 105 Von Hannover, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228 at ¶ 108. See also Axel Springer, 
2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 227 at ¶ 89. 
 106 Von Hannover, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 228 at ¶ 108.  
 107 Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google 
Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶¶ 6–7 (June 25, 2013).  
 108 Id. at ¶¶ 11–21. The lawyers filed suit at the ECHR against the Polish 
government because the Warsaw Regional Court, Court of Appeals, and 
Supreme Court refused to hear the case. 
 109 Id. at ¶¶ 56–57. 
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billions of users worldwide, is not and potentially will never be subject 
to the same regulations and control.110 
The ECHR went on to explain that it “accepts that it is not the 
role of judicial authorities to engage in rewriting history by 
ordering the removal from the public domain of all traces of 
publication which have in the past been found . . . .”111 Here, too, 
critics of the Google Spain judgment could point to the 
Węgrzynowski & Smolczewski decision for the argument that it was 
not the role of the CJEU to enable a revision of historically truthful 
data by requiring suppression or erasure. 112  But finally, as in 
Google Spain, the ECHR in Węgrzynowski & Smolczewski 
recognizes “the risk of harm posed by content and communications 
on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is 
certainly higher than that posed by the press.”113 Therefore, despite 
the ECHR’s dicta about the importance of the internet and the free 
flow of data, the Węgrzynowski & Smolczewski case is not so 
different from the Google Spain ruling that recognizes the 
possibility of protecting privacy when there is only limited impact 
on the freedom of expression. 
Given the direct applicability of these cases, it is unfortunate 
that the CJEU did not include analysis of the relevant ECHR case 
law in the Google Spain decision. If the CJEU had looked to the 
ECHR cases it likely would not have issued a different ruling; 
however, it would have provided more clarity about the extent to 
which the ruling should be applied to different facts. 
Let us suppose that the CJEU adopted the Springer-Hannover 
test. Google’s processing of Mr. Casteja González’s data would 
fail this test, as publication of sixteen-year old fully repaid debts 
from a non-public figure is not critical for the preservation of free 
                                                
 110 Wegrzynowski & Smolczewski, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 224, at ¶ 58 (quotations 
omitted). 
 111 Id. at ¶ 65. 
 112 Critics may also point to Frantziou, supra note 97 at 774 (noting that while 
the Google Spain case is not necessarily incompatible with the ECHR, the 
ECHR’s judgment in Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski suggests that such 
incompatibility cannot be ruled out either.). 
 113 Wegrzynowski & Smolczewski, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 224, at ¶ 58. 
464 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 17: 437 
expression. Nevertheless, such analysis is valuable and would have 
provided useful guidance for businesses, policymakers, and 
academics. The Google Spain Advocate General’s report warned 
the CJEU that asserting the existence of a right to be forgotten or 
any similar iterance of such a right would be problematic. It stated 
that enforcement of a right to be forgotten would call into question 
its compatibility with other fundamental rights, already inked into 
the Charter.114 The lack of explanatory guidance in the CJEU 
opinion created the uncertainty the Advocate General warned 
against. 
In the following sections, the paper explores this global 
uncertainty and recommends how to move forward with 
implementation that would establish criteria for decisions about 
delisting, enhance legal certainty for companies making these 
decisions, and minimize the impact on free expression. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF GOOGLE SPAIN: GLOBAL IMPACT 
The effects of the Google Spain decision and the “right to 
obscurity” have reverberated worldwide, causing organizations to 
rethink the complex issues surrounding privacy and freedom of 
expression.115 Individuals around the world express concern about 
the degree to which people can access information about them, 
while they increasingly use Internet tools to discover information 
about others (job candidates, child care givers, prospective 
romantic partners, neighbors, teachers, etc.). Policymakers 
worldwide are re-examining the degree to which individuals 
should be able to “know” each other. Countries such as France, 
Canada, Russia, Hong Kong and South Korea are attempting to 
determine how much access to information about individuals is 
appropriate.116 
                                                
 114 Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google 
Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
González, 2013 E.C.R. 424, ¶ 81 (June 25, 2013). 
 115  Phil Muncaster, Firms Already Swamped by Right to be Forgotten 
Requests, INFOSECURITY, www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/firms-
swamped-right-to-be. 
 116 See infra parts V.A–G. 
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In an age of easy access to sensitive personal information, 
countries’ interest in fostering individuals’ obscurity is 
understandable. Search engines and data brokers have 
quantitatively and qualitatively changed the ability to access 
information about individuals, no matter how private, and no 
matter what the potential risk the information creates. Access to 
information is now global—anyone on the planet can instantly 
probe the details about a person located anywhere around the 
world. This unprecedented access to the details of others’ lives 
highlights the conflicting way varying cultures view governments’ 
need to protect citizens from harm and from observation by 
others.117 
Countries are responding to this issue in a variety of ways. 
Some countries are attempting to enforce delisting requests beyond 
EU borders.118 Other non-European countries are weighing the 
consequences of introducing their local flavor of obscurity into 
their Internet, data protection, and cyber security laws.119 What 
follows are examples of how different countries are dealing with 
the issue. 
A. France 
In Europe, issues surrounding data protection, privacy and 
freedom of expression do not end with the CJEU decision. Many 
post-Google Spain challenges remain, in particular for member 
states who must address citizens’ concerns about data protection, 
erasure, obscurity, and freedom of expression.120 The Article 29 
Working Party issued guidelines asserting that, “Under EU law, 
everyone has a right to data protection . . . . Decisions must be 
                                                
 117 For an excellent book discussing these developments, see VIKTOR MAYER-
SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
(Princeton Univ. Press, 2011). 
 118  Samuel Gibbs, French Data Regulator Rejects Google’s Right-to-be-
Forgotten Appeal, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2015), www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2015/sep/21/French-google-right-to-be-forgotten-appeal. 
 119 See infra Part V. 
 120 Jeff J. Roberts, Google Defies France over “Right to be Forgotten,” 
FORTUNE (Jul. 30, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/30/google-france-right-to-
be-forgotten/. 
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implemented in such a way that they guarantee the effective and 
complete protection of data subjects’ rights and that EU law cannot 
be circumvented.”121 Although the opinions issued by the working 
group are non-binding, they can be influential. The French privacy 
regulators appear to have found this language particularly 
persuasive, given the French regulator’s subsequent engagements 
with Google. Since the ruling was handed down, France has been 
at the forefront of this dialogue and the post-decision 
implementation process. 
In June 2015, La Commission National de l’Informatique et des 
Libertes (“CNIL”),122 the French privacy regulatory body, ruled 
that Google was required to abide by “obscurity” requests in 
France, not only locally, but globally. 123  Although the search 
engine automatically directs users in France to Google’s French 
domain (google.fr) by analyzing the location of the connecting 
Internet protocol address, French citizens are still able to access 
Google’s other international domains (e.g., google.com, 
google.ca). At first, the CNIL’s orders mirrored the CJEU ruling in 
that the CNIL’s removal requests were specific to the Google 
France domain.124 However, cognizant of the fact that users around 
the world can easily redirect their search inquiries to other Google 
sites, the CNIL sought to prevent users from accessing the 
                                                
 121 Mark Scott, France Wants Google to Apply Right to Be Forgotten Ruling 
Worldwide of Face Penalties, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2015), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/12/french-regulator-wants-google-to-appl 
y-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling-worldwide/. 
 122 CNIL’s purpose, generally, is to educate its citizens about impending 
privacy issues, to protect its citizens from privacy and civil liberty harms, to 
regulate issues dealing with privacy and the digital economy, and to penalize 
those that violate French privacy rules. CNIL is the administrative body 
responsible for enforcing the erasure requests.  See Role and Responsibilities, 
CNIL, https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-missions. 
 123 See CNIL Orders Google to Apply Delisting on All Domain Names of the 
Search Engine, CNIL (June 12, 2015) http://www.cnil.fr/linstitution/actualite/ 
article/article/cnil-orders-google-to-apply-delisting-on-all-domain-names-of-the 
-search-engine/ (“CNIL considers that in order to be effective, delisting must be 
carried out on all extensions of the search engine and that the service provided 
by Google search constitutes a single processing.”). 
 124 Id. 
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suppressed information at any and all access points.125 In their 
view, to do otherwise would render a removal order ineffective.126 
French authorities gave Google two weeks to apply the ruling 
across all of its domains or face fines of over $350,000.127 The 
company appealed the CNIL’s ruling.128 But in September 2015, 
the CNIL rejected Google’s effort to limit the worldwide 
application of the ruling for French applicants or face financial 
penalties.129 Any potential fine will be appealed in French courts.130 
Google’s appeal to the CNIL was rejected largely because of the 
regulator’s concern about the ease with which the right to obscurity 
could be circumvented.131 
The CNIL attempted to mitigate concerns about its worldwide 
removal request by explaining that any information sought can still 
be accessed at its original sources and that removal of the 
information is not absolute.132 However, it appears that the CNIL is 
not just worried about citizens in France seeing the non-relevant 
material. Instead, it seems the CNIL wants to make certain that no 
one in the world is able to do an Internet search to reveal the 
information.133 
It remains to be seen whether Google will propose to the CNIL 
alternative ways to carry out its orders, such as by increasing the 
degree to which it blocks access to other Google domains inside of 
                                                
125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Commission Nationale de L’Informatique et des Libertes, CNIL Orders 
Google to Apply Delisting on All Domain Names of the Search Engine, CNIL 
(June 12, 2015), http://www.cnil.fr/linstitution/actualite/article/article/cnil-
orders-google-to-apply-delisting-on-all-domain-names-of-the-search-engine/. 
 128 Id. 
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http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/right-to-delisting-
google-informal-appeal-rejected/. 
 132 Id. 
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France. Google could accomplish this by preventing users from 
manually overriding the selection of Google.fr. Individuals could 
still use other methods, such as spoofing IP addresses134 from other 
geographies to access Google.com. Moreover, it is unclear the 
extent to which the CNIL would force Google to silo its services 
geographically, and the degree to which French CJEUs would 
continue to find jurisdiction over those non-French domains. Also, 
as mentioned above, none of these efforts will accomplish the 
CNILs goal to protect French citizens from people accessing 
information outside of France. This conflict is one that many 
Internet companies will likely face as they attempt to provide 
global services that conflict with local laws and cultures. 135 
Implementation challenges are not unique to the European 
continent. France is just one example. 
B. Other EU Member States 
The Spanish implementing legislation requires that the Spanish 
court now issue its own ruling in accordance with the CJEU 
opinion. Similarly, each individual EU Member State data 
protection authority will need to interpret the opinion as they apply 
their national laws. The fragmentation that will result from the 
application of twenty-eight member state laws will pose serious 
compliance problem for global companies. The CJEU held that 
data from sixteen years ago is too old to be relevant in the context 
of the facts of the Google Spain case. 136  How does a court 
determine at what point or under what circumstances data is no 
longer relevant? It is difficult to predict how twenty-eight different 
                                                
 134 In computer networking, Internet Protocol (“IP”) address spoofing or IP 
spoofing is the creation of IP packets with a forged source IP address, with the 
purpose of concealing the identity of the sender or impersonating another 
computing system. See IP Spoofing, CISCO.COM, http://www.cisco.com/web/ 
about/ac123/ac147/archived_issues/ipj_10-4/104_ip-spoofing.html. 
 135 See, e.g., Peter Fleischer, Implementing a European, Not Global, Right to 
be Forgotten, GOOGLE EUROPE BLOG (July 30, 2015), 
http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com/2015/07/implementing-european-not-
global-right.html. 
 136 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de 
Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 
98 (May 13, 2014). 
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member states will interpret the need to optimize the rights of the 
individual and the “preponderant interest of the general public 
. . . .”137 
The CJEU is not charged with addressing concerns about 
harmonization, and its decision creates a pressing need for further 
guidance. It also points to one of the problems posed by the 
European system in which the Directive creates a regulatory floor, 
but not a ceiling for member states. The case illustrates why it is 
important to further pursue harmonization mechanisms like the 
“one-stop-shop,” which the European Commission proposed in the 
Draft General Data Protection Regulation as a means to provide 
more predictability and certainty across Europe.138 
C. Canada 
The British Columbia Supreme Court in Canada dealt with the 
issue of the ability of Internet search engines to provide global 
access to information, and how privacy and freedom of expression 
should be balanced. In Equustek Solutions, Inc. v. Datalink 
Technologies, Inc., 139  an appellate court in British Columbia 
required Google to remove sensitive intellectual property 
information from the results provided by all of its local and 
international search engines. 140  In Equustek, the complaining 
company filed suit against a hardware distributor for distributing 
Equustek products under its own name.141 The underlying case was 
a fairly uncontroversial Canadian trademark infringement case to 
which Google was not a party. Equustek applied to the British 
                                                
 137 See Press Release No 70/14, supra note 1. 
 138  See generally The One-Stop-Shop Mechanism, COUNCIL OF THE EU 
6833/15 (2015), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/ srv?l=EN&f=ST%2068 
33%202015%20INIT (discussing how the GDPR Proposal’s “One-Stop-Shop” 
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enforcement. The mechanism is supposed to allocate responsibility for 
supervising data controllers and data processors that are working in several 
different European markets to a “main establishment” so that it eliminates the 
complexities of having to work with a different data protection authority in 
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139 Equustek Sols. Inc. v. DataLink Technologies, [2014] BCSC 1063 (Can.).	  
 140 Id. at ¶ 9 (Can.). 
 141 Id. at ¶¶ 4–5. 
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Columbia Supreme Court for an injunction ordering Google to 
remove all links to Datalink websites from all searches conducted 
worldwide.142 
There is precedent in Canadian law for issuing interlocutory 
orders to protect Canadian companies from further trade secret or 
intellectual property rights violations.143 Therefore, the fact that 
Google was not a party to the underlying litigation did not prevent 
the court from making the order. 144  Google claimed that the 
injunction should not have been granted because (1) the 
application did not have a sufficient connection to the Province to 
give the Supreme Court of British Columbia competence to deal 
with the matter and (2) “the extraterritorial reach of the injunction 
is inappropriate and a violation of the principles of comity.”145 The 
Supreme Court granted the injunction, because it was sympathetic 
to the plaintiff’s argument that effective protection of its trademark 
would require global obscurity so that it could be properly 
protected.146 
As in France, the Equustek court advocated for worldwide 
removal of specific information from all Google domains.147 The 
court found a “real and substantial connection” between Google 
and British Columbia through Google’s advertising activities, 
using an analysis similar to that in Google Spain.148 Even though 
Google houses no servers or offices in British Columbia, the court 
found that the company had purposefully availed itself of Canadian 
territory and thus should be subject to in personam jurisdiction.149 
Advertising, the use of web crawler software, and similar business 
                                                
 142 Id. at ¶¶ 8–9. 
 143 See Equustek Sols. Inc. v. Google Inc., [2015] BCC 265, ¶ 69 (Can.); see 
also judgment of Arnold J. in Cartier International AG v. British Sky 
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activities consisted of contacts sufficiently substantial to subject 
Google to Canadian jurisdiction.150 
Google attempted to make an extraterritoriality argument by 
claiming that the court could not regulate the activities in foreign 
jurisdictions due to pragmatism and comity. 151  But the court 
explained that in personam jurisdiction is not limited by residency; 
because Google does business in Canada, it may have jurisdiction 
over it due to its activities.152 The court also found that concerns 
about comity were overblown.153 “The only comity concern that 
has been articulated in this case is the concern that the order made 
by the trial judge could interfere with freedom of expression in 
other countries.”154 The court doubted the potential of its decision 
to affect other nations or to conflict with the fundamental 
principles of other nations on freedom of expression and data 
protection.155 Focusing on the intellectual property aspect of the 
case, the court explained that the protection of intellectual property 
rights should come before Google’s commercial advertising 
business.156 The court concluded that, internationally, it is not 
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unusual for courts or regulatory bodies to issue such orders, despite 
their potential complexities.157 
D. Hong Kong 
Allan Chiang, the head privacy official of Hong Kong, has 
asked Google to “observe the right to be forgotten outside of 
Europe”158 in the interest of protecting citizens’ privacy. However, 
critics have expressed concern about the effect of such a policy, 
stating that it could encourage Hong Kong government leaders to 
follow the example of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and 
substantially limit the free flow of information. 159  Currently 
information flows in Hong Kong remain relatively protected and 
unregulated except in instances related to media and publication 
rights. 160  Regulation in Hong Kong is generally designed to 
promote data flows.161 Nevertheless, policymakers in Hong Kong 
are examining issues surrounding obscurity, freedom of expression 
and the cross-border flow of data in the West.162 
E. South Korea 
Communication regulators in South Korea are evaluating 
whether to introduce a “European-style” right to obscurity into 
Korean law. 163  South Korean law already includes substantial 
protections against online defamation, providing that individuals 
may request that libelous or defamatory information be removed 
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from websites.164 South Korea regulators have discussed potentially 
creating a new law that would allow for delisting from search 
results in certain circumstances.165 
F. Russia 
Legislators in Russia have drafted a law that would provide the 
right to obscurity to Russian citizens. The Russian law however, 
goes beyond the framework established in Europe.166 In Europe, 
Google set up a procedure whereby “people could point out links 
they wanted removed from their own name-search results, along 
with an explanation of why the content was ‘inadequate, irrelevant 
or no longer relevant.’”167 Google generally requires applicants 
who request delisting to provide specific hyperlinks they wish to 
have removed.168 The Russian bill requires only that applicants 
indicate the information they want deleted.169 
The ECHR case law is clear that public figures enjoy only a 
limited right to privacy.170 However, “the Russian version extends 
the right to erasure to public figures and information that is 
considered in the public interest.”171 Search companies may deny a 
request, but if the applicant appeals in court and wins, non-
compliance could result in fines of over $50,000 per request.172 
Considering that Google has had hundreds of thousands of requests 
already within the EU, search engines face the prospect of 
significant fines in Russia. 
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G. The United States 
The concepts explored in Google Spain are also covered in the 
United States Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) analysis of the 
data broker industry. 173  The FTC specifically called out the 
challenges to privacy that come from data brokers that provide 
“people search” services.174 The FTC unanimously recommended 
in their report that Congress: 
consider legislation requiring data brokers offering people search 
products to: (1) allow consumers to access their own information; (2) 
allow consumers to opt out of the use of the information; (3) clearly 
disclose to consumers the data brokers’ sources of information, so that, 
if possible, the consumer can correct his or her information at the 
source; and (4) clearly disclose any limitations of the opt out, such as 
the fact that close matches of an individual’s name may continue to 
appear in search results.175 
The FTC report highlights United States regulators’ concerns 
about the privacy implications of services that allow easy access to 
large amounts of an individual’s personal information based solely 
on a search of that individual’s name.176 The FTC report points out 
that this concern is not new, but was a motivation for enactment of 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act in the 1970s.177 It also cites this 
concern as the reason the Individual Reference Services Group 
temporarily established a self-regulatory program to provide more 
transparency with respect to people search services.178 The United 
States has a long history of allowing for the “forgetting” of 
information deemed to have a disproportionate impact on the 
individual.179 Most American states have laws that require the 
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expunging of criminal records of minors.180 This motivation for 
erasure of these criminal records is evidence of a cultural belief 
that people should be allowed to make mistakes, suffer 
consequences for their decisions, but then be permitted to move 
on.181 
Similarly, many states are pursuing “revenge porn” laws.182 
These laws would provide individuals with the ability to block the 
posting of explicit videos and pictures often made available by ex-
lovers who want to embarrass and inflict emotional pain on their 
former partners. While these videos are “truthful data,” often 
recorded with the subject’s full knowledge, the United States 
believes that making this truthful information available will have a 
disproportionate impact on the individual.183 
                                                                                                         
inhibited that right); see also Daniel Solove, What Google Must Forget: The EU 
Ruling on the Right to Be Forgotten, LINKEDIN PULSE, (May 13, 2014), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20140513230300-2259773-what-google-must-
forget-the-eu-ruling-on-the-right-to-be-forgotten (explaining that “the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act provides for a right to delete personal data. The 
Fair Credit Reporting Act restricts the ability of consumer reporting agencies to 
report on bankruptcies and criminal proceedings that are beyond a certain 
number of years old”). But see Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d 
Cir. 1940) (holding that one cannot easily ignore one’s status as a celebrity or a 
public figure and thus attempt to control the dissemination of factual 
information about one’s life despite already being a public figure). 
 180 “[Forty-five] states and the District of Columbia provide for expungement 
for some ex-offenders or other similar relief.” Expungement, ELECTRONIC 
PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, https://epic.org/privacy/expungement/#federal 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015) 
 181 Meg Leta Ambrose et al., Seeking Digital Redemption: The Future of 
Forgiveness in the Internet Age, 29 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 99, 110–17 
(2012). 
 182 Currently, twenty-six states have “revenge porn laws”. See 26 States Have 
Revenge Porn Laws, END REVENGE PORN FOUNDATION, 
http://www.endrevengeporn.org/revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015) 
(providing citations for the applicable state law civil or penal code provision). 
 183 See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., et al., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 
(C.D. Cal. 1998); Amy Lai, Revenge Porn Legislation Activists and the Lessons 
from Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence: Gender Neutrality, Public Perceptions 
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The limited ability in the United States to challenge 
disproportionate truthful information often leads to strange results. 
Take for instance the posting of the nude celebrity photos allegedly 
accessed by hacking mobile phones.184 Laws exist that prohibit 
hacking digital devices.185 Laws also exist that prohibit those who 
trespass on private property from taking unauthorized videos, 
phone recordings, or pictures.186 However, prosecuting the data 
thief does not fully mitigate the harm to the victim if search 
engines and data brokers will continue to direct people to the 
content forever. While the hacked celebrities could not request 
removal of the photos based on their need for privacy, they were 
allowed to demand the pictures be taken down based on copyright 
violations. 187  The celebrities, as the photographers, owned the 
intellectual property rights to the photos.188 The United States legal 
structure in this respect has valued intellectual property rights more 
than privacy rights. If the images had been illegally photographed 
by a third party through an open window, a hotel door peep hole or 
an illegally installed wireless camera, the celebrities’ ability to 
demand obscurity of the photos would be limited. 
                                                
 184 See, e.g., Mike Isacc, Nude Photos of Jennifer Lawrence Are Latest Front 
in Online Privacy Debate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/09/03/technology/trove-of-nude-photos-sparks-debate-over-online-
behavior.html. 
 185 See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2010). 
 186 See, e.g., The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–
(c)(1)(C) (2012); see also Digital Millennium Copyright Act, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, https://www.eff.org/issues/dmca (last visited Feb. 22, 
2016) (explaining how the DMCA “safe harbor” provisions protect service 
providers from liability by complying with “notice and takedown” procedures). 
 187 Alex Fitzpatrick, Here’s How Celebs Can Get Their Nude Selfies Taken 
Down, TIME MAG. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://time.com/3256732/jennifer-lawrence-
selfies-copyright/ (“Jennifer Lawrence, Kate Upton, Kirsten Dunst . . . could . . . 
file a [Digital Millennium Copyright Act] takedown notice while they fill out the 
paperwork for a formal copyright on their photos, assuming they took the 
images of themselves. If their takedown notices are ignored, they can then sue 
the sites in question for copyright violation.”). 
 188 Id. 
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VI. THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL INTERNET OBSCURITY CENTER 
Search engines have responded to the lack of obscurity rights 
by creating their own policies for delisting or erasure. Google 
states in its policies that in addition to removing content that 
violates copyright, it also delists depictions of child sexual 
abuse.189 Google also states that it may remove the following 
information: 
• National identification numbers like United States Social Security 
Number, Argentine Single Tax Identification Number, Brazil Cadastro 
de pessoas Físicas, Korea Resident Registration Number, China 
Resident Identity Card, etc.[;] 
• Bank account numbers[;]  
• Credit card numbers[;]  
• Images of signatures[;]  
• Nude or sexually explicit images that were uploaded or shared 
without your consent[.]190 
Google states that it uses the following criteria to determine 
whether it will delist the link to the information: 
To decide if a piece of personal information creates significant risks of 
identity theft, financial fraud, or other specific harms, we ask: 
• Is it a government-issued identification number? 
• Is it confidential, or is it publicly available information? 
• Can it be used for common financial transactions? 
• Can it be used to obtain more information about an individual that 
would result in financial harm or identity theft? 
• Is it a personally identifiable nude or sexually explicit photo or 
video shared without consent? 
We apply this policy on a case-by-case basis. If we believe that a 
removal request is being used to try and remove other, non-personal 
information from search results, we will deny the request. Note: We 
usually don’t remove information that can be found on official 
government websites because the information is publicly available.191 
It appears from these policies that Google understands that it 
must provide some level of obscurity for individuals because of the 
tremendous impact its services make on the lives of those people 
whose data is revealed. However, the mechanism by which Google 
                                                
 189  See Removal Policies, GOOGLE.COM, https://support.google.com/ 
websearch/answer/2744324?hl=en (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
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makes these decisions is not transparent to those individuals or 
regulators. 
The CJEU opinion 192  creates substantial implementation 
problems for search engines and data brokers that must determine 
when links to information should be removed. Companies in these 
businesses may err on the side of caution to avoid regulatory 
action, and comply with requests to remove links to content in 
more situations than just search results from the query of an 
individual’s name. By doing so, these compliance efforts may limit 
the free flow of information more than necessary to protect 
individual privacy. It seems unfair, and in fact inappropriate to 
charge private companies like Google with developing and 
applying criteria to determine under what circumstances to protect 
an individual’s right to obscurity. This type of a determination is 
usually reserved for a body elected by and accountable to citizens. 
However, the complex global need for a right to obscurity creates 
issues related to the jurisdiction, powers and procedures of a 
government body that would make these determinations. 
One way to deal with the complexity of implementing the 
CJEU’s guidance would be to establish a centralized body to  
handle “obscurity requests” from individuals. This could be called 
an “Internet Obscurity Center,” overseen by regulators who would 
opt through their country’s legislation to work with the Center. 
This system would allow individuals to first go to the Center with a 
complaint, and only resort to filing a complaint with the regulator 
if they are not satisfied with the result provided by the Center. 
Regulators could provide search engines and data brokers with 
protection from liability when following the direction of such a 
centralized obscurity center. The obscurity center could function as 
a co-regulatory body with companies voluntarily participating. 
Companies would agree to eventual oversight of the regulatory 
agencies, and would agree to comply with delisting 
recommendations made by the Center. The Center would create a 
more efficient system, which removes the burden of making these 
                                                
 192 See Opinion of AG Jååskinen, case C-131/12, Google Spain SL and 
Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario 
Costeja González, 2013 E.C.R. 424 (June 25, 2013). 
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determinations from each individual company and provides 
individuals with reasonable access to a remedy. This model would 
also provide an international solution and an effective forum for a 
transparent international dialogue on the criteria for delisting. 
The obscurity center would need to make difficult judgments 
about when information should be obscured. However, as the 
authors have previously written,193 in addition to the test articulated 
in the ECHR case law, other criteria can be used to determine if 
information should warrant obscurity. The authors suggest that the 
following six criteria the Center could use to evaluate obscurity 
requests: 
Criterion Description Example 
Lapse of time A person did a bad 
thing but truly feels 
sorry, paid debt, and 
learned the lesson 
A drunk driving 
conviction followed by 




The original collection 
or use of the data 
violated a law 
Trespass, identity theft, 
service provider employee 
theft, blackmail, revenge 
porn, stalking 
Discrimination The likelihood an 
individual will be 
discriminated against 
on the basis of the 
information 




Sensitive Data Information that the 
individual just doesn’t 
want people knowing 
Bank account information, 
social security number, 
health data 
                                                
 193 David Hoffman, Europe’s New Right to be Forgotten: Not New and Not 
Forgetting, POLICY @ INTEL BLOG (July 16, 2014), https://blogs.intel.com/ 
policy/2014/07/16/europes-new-right-forgotten-new-forgetting/. 
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Taken Out of 
Context 
Information that is 
misleading or creates 
a negative impression 
when taken out of its 
original context 
Placing some punk rock 
lyrics in a blog about the 
use of profanity in music, 
and later the lyrics are 





certain crime victims  
Domestic violence 
victims 
These categories and the ECHR test would need to be refined 
before search engines and data brokers put them into practice 
globally. Which organizations would be required to abide by the 
obscurity center’s decisions would need to be clearly articulated. 
However, given the concentration of internet searching and data 
broker activity in a few powerful players, simply applying the 
process to the leading companies would provide individuals with 
access to considerable practical obscurity. 
The obscurity center could establish a board of advisors 
comprising globally recognized privacy and free expression 
experts to help refine the decision-making criteria. The criteria 
could and should be created in an open and transparent process 
with full opportunity for comment by civil society, government 
and industry. If companies or individuals are not satisfied with any 
individual decision made by the obscurity center, they could appeal 
the decision to their country’s regulator or court system. Such a 
system would take the burden off of the search engines and data 
brokers and appropriately place it on regulators and the courts. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In light of the provisions of the Directive, the CJEU was 
neither insane, nor nearsighted when it decided Google Spain. It is 
fair, however, to fault the CJEU for providing only minimal 
guidance on how to implement such an important ruling on a topic 
critical to fundamental human rights. The CJEU’s opinion has 
furthered a discussion that requires more analysis and creative 
thinking about how to promote the trust of individuals in the use of 
the digital infrastructure. Finding methods to implement the 
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CJEU’s opinion will be difficult, and must guard against unduly 
limiting free expression. 
This implementation needs to comprehend where technology is 
headed, given advances in data analytics, cloud computing and the 
Internet of things. Traditional spaces of increased privacy 
protection, like the home, will need these obscurity rights to 
continue to be a place of refuge for individuals. At the same time, 
the decision should be implemented in a way that will promote free 
expression, providing assurances that individuals can take risks, 
voice unpopular opinions, engage in political dissent, and question 
the status quo without fear that a record of their speech will be 
globally available in perpetuity. Continued discussion of “the right 
to obscurity” is necessary. That exploration is critically important 
at a time where efforts are underway to put in place new privacy 
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